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Abstract
Trust lies at the crux of most economic transactions, with credit
markets being a notable example. Drawing on insights from the liter-
ature on coordination games and network growth, we develop a simple
model to clarify how trust breaks down in financial systems. We show
how the arrival of bad news about a financial agent can lead others
to lose confidence in it and how this, in turn, can spread across the
entire system. Our results emphasize the role of hysteresis – it takes
considerable effort to regain trust once it has been broken. Although
simple, the model provides a plausible account of the credit freeze
that followed the global financial crisis of 2007/8, both in terms of the
sequence of events and the measures taken (and being proposed) by
the authorities.
1 Introduction
Trust is ubiquitous in social and economic activity, irrespective of underlying
cultural differences. Drawing from the literature on social capital [1], trust
is defined as “the commitment of resources to an activity where the outcome
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depends upon the cooperative behavior of others”. Moreover, it seems to
obey a type of self-reinforcing dynamic [2, 3] – individuals continue to trust
beyond the point where evidence points to the contrary. Eventually, however,
the accumulated weight of evidence turns them towards distrust, which is
equally reinforcing.
Credit markets exemplify the way in which trust lies at the very foun-
dation of modern financial systems. Indeed, the very word “credit” derives
from the Latin, credere, which means to trust. If credit is readily available,
it enables us to derive goods and services from those whom we do not know
or have any reason to trust. Schumpeter [4] highlights the critical role of
credit in real economic activity, noting that “capitalism is that form of pri-
vate property economy in which innovations are carried out by means of
borrowed money [credit].”
Viewed in this light, a proximate cause of the global financial crises of
2007/08 has been the generalized breakdown of trust between banks and in-
vestors in banks. The triggers were revelations of losses on United States
sub-prime mortgages and other toxic financial assets by banks. An immedi-
ate consequence was a freeze in interbank money markets, as banks ceased
lending to each other. Mounting funding pressures, in turn, lead to questions
about banks’ future profitability and, in some cases, viability.
Fig. 1 illustrates how the arrival of news of losses at troubled hedge
funds, downgrades of structured financial products, and concerns about as-
set quality increased funding pressures on banks. Before the crisis, banks
required some 10 basis points of compensation for making one month loans
to each other. By September 2007, that compensation premium had risen
to around 100 basis points. The ensuing collapse of the investment banks
Bear Sterns and Lehman Brothers in 2008 led the premium to rise more than
thirty-fold from pre-crisis levels. And, despite public sector bailouts of the
banking system in the major economies, trust has been slow to return.
While specific details and rigorous economic modelling are necessary to
properly understand the financial crisis, there is nonetheless scope to clar-
ify the mechanisms by which trust evaporates in networks in general, and
financial networks in particular. When credit markets break down, strategic
uncertainty – i.e., uncertainty about the actions of other participants – can
be more important than structural uncertainty – i.e., uncertainty concerning
the soundness of fundamentals [5, 6]. In the case of a bank run, for ex-
ample, depositors may consider withdrawing their funds if they believe that
other depositors are also going to withdraw their savings. Such behavior
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can be triggered by doubts over the banks’ balance sheet position (structural
uncertainty), or by fears that others may withdraw their funds (strategic un-
certainty). With imperfect common knowledge of fundamentals, the arrival
of bad news about fundamentals leads small seeds of doubt to reverberate
across all lenders, leading potentially to a wholesale withdrawal of lending
and the bankruptcy of the counterparty.
Morris and Shin [5, 6] formalize such situations as a coordination game
between lenders involved with a single, risky, counter-party. Their analysis
does not, however, address the issue of wide-spread contagion at the sys-
tem level. As the recent crisis makes clear, small seeds of doubt about one
counter-party reverberated across the entire global financial system, envelop-
ing credit markets from New York to Sydney. Agents are likely to be involved
in as many coordination games as the number of agents they are lending to.
In addition, as borrowers, they are also party to coordination games being
played by the agents lending to them. In short, in realistic financial market
settings, many coordination games take place simultaneously, with players
having less than full information about the balance sheet positions of their
counterparties.
In this paper, we extend the insight offered by coordination games to the
system level using a model of network growth. Specifically, we show how the
arrival of signals about counterparties sows the seeds of distrust and triggers
foreclosures across a large population. The model, thus, helps shed light on
the recent “freeze” in global interbank lending, in which banks ceased lending
to each other, including to well known and long-standing counterparties, once
negative signals began to accumulate.
Our results may be summarized as follows: the financial system can con-
verge to a “good” equilibrium in which a dense network of credit relations
exists and the risk of a run, and subsequent default, is negligible. But a
“bad” equilibrium is also possible – here the credit network is sparse because
investors are more skittish and prone to prematurely foreclosing their credit
relationships. The transition between the two equilibria is sharp and both
states exhibit a degree of resilience; once a crisis tips the system into the
sparse state, the restoration of trust requires considerable effort, with model
parameters needing to shift well beyond the turning point. And when the
system reverts to a good state, it is robust even to deteriorating conditions.
A crucial feature of our model is the rate at which bad news about the
creditworthiness of an agent arrives. This, together with the maturity struc-
ture of debt contracts, determines the (endogenous) rate of link decay in the
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network. Intuitively, when bad news arrives an agent may be forced into
default by the ensuing foreclosures. This leads to a rearrangement of balance
sheets across the financial system – agents who have lent to it loose assets,
while agents who borrowed from the defaulter loose liabilities. As a result,
there is a possibility that some counterparties may be placed under stress,
precipitating further rounds of foreclosures. We discuss the properties of the
stationary state of these processes.
Our paper complements recent work on interbank contagion. On the
empirical front, researchers have relied on counterfactual simulations based
on available interbank exposure data to estimate the probability and spread
of contagion (see [7] for a review). The key finding is that network contagion
is unlikely but, if it were to take place, can lead to the breakdown of a
substantial fraction of the banking system. Unlike our paper, these analyses
treat the underlying topology of interactions and the balance sheets of the
agents as static.
Theoretical literature in the area builds upon Allen and Gale [8] and fo-
cuses on optimal behavior in small networks. For example, Caballero and
Simsek [9] perturb a financial network in order to model the spread of con-
tagion. They appeal to the rising costs of understanding the structure of
the network as the basis for complexity. If information about the network
structure is costless, there is no foreclosure. But if, following a shock, these
information costs rise sharply, banks’ inability to understand the structure
of the (small) network to which they belong leads them to withdraw from
their loan commitments.
In a related contribution, Acharya et. al. [10] also highlight the role
played by information arrival relative to rollover frequency. While their model
is also about runs in credit markets, they do not adopt a network approach.
Moreover, their focus is on the debt capacity of assets used as collateral
for short-term borrowing, whereas our emphasis is on the self-reinforcing
dynamics of trust in the face of information disclosure.
The remainder of this paper in organized as follows. In Sec. 2 we begin
by presenting a solution to the single instance coordination game using the
global games framework. This is followed by our network growth model for
credit markets. In Sec. 3 we provide simulation and numerical results for
our model, followed by a simple analytical characterization for the stationary
states. We conclude in Sec. 4 by describing how our model provides insight
to the financial crises of 2007/08 and add to the evolving regulatory policy
discussion. We relegate some of the more technical details to the appendices.
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2 The model
Consider a population of N agents engaged in bilateral credit relationships
with each other. A financial system of this kind can be viewed as a directed
network, with nodes representing the agents and outgoing links reflecting
loans from one agent to another. To keep matters simple, suppose that all
loans take the same nominal value.
The financial position of agent i is summarized by the assets and liabilities
on its balance sheet. Assets include holdings of cash, b0i , as well as loans
made to other agents, bi. Liabilities, namely the monies owed by agent i to
its counterparties, are denoted by ℓi and reflect (the number of) incoming
links. Since every liability is someone else’s asset, every outgoing link for one
node is an incoming link for another node. So the total amount of assets in
the system matches the total liabilities or, equivalently, the average in-degree
equals the average out-degree 〈b〉 = 〈ℓ〉, where the angled bracket refers to
the average over all agents. That said, individual agents may be in surplus
or deficit in their individual financial positions. The average connectivity,
ρ = 〈ℓ〉 of the network offers a summary measure of the extent of global
financial market integration in what follows.
The credit network is dynamic, with debt contracts (or links) continuously
being established and terminated as they reach maturity. The dynamic evo-
lution of the network is punctuated by episodes where the ℓi lenders of agent
i engage in a game to decide whether to prematurely foreclose their loans to
i. We first describe this foreclosure game, before clarifying the dynamics of
the network.
2.1 Foreclosure game
Imagine that, at a particular time tν , agent i has ℓi liabilities, bi assets and b
0
i
amount of cash. This information is disclosed to all ℓi lenders, who are then
given the choice of withdrawing their funds (foreclosing) or rolling them over
to maturity. We follow the analysis of Morris and Shin [6] in describing this
situation. Accordingly, their paper and Appx. A provide a detailed game-
theoretic account, while we limit the discussion below to the key elements.
For each creditor j, foreclosure yields a payoff of zero, whereas rolling
over yields a payoff of 1 − cj > 0, provided that the number of lenders who
opt out does not exceed bi + b
0
i , on the asset side of agent i’s balance sheet.
If, however, more than bi + b
0
i agents opt out, this depletes the financial
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resources of agent i, who is forced into default. This results in lender j, who
decided to roll over, to incur a loss of cj . Following [6], we refer to cj as the
cost of miscoordination to j. Intuitively, when the cost of miscoordination
is high, coordination is more difficult to achieve since the opportunity cost
of remaining in the investment is greater. The payoff matrix for agent j, in
terms of the number ℓ′i of lenders who foreclose, is therefore
ℓ′i ≤ bi + b0i ℓ′i > bi + b0i
foreclose 0 0
roll over 1− cj −cj
. (1)
If no agent were to foreclose, it would be convenient to roll over for all of
them, as long as cj < 1. But if an agent nurture doubts on others foreclosing,
this may prompt the agent to consequently foreclose, making those doubts
self-fulfilling. Agents know their cost cj and that the costs of other agents are
drawn from some distribution. In this manner, one breaks the assumption of
common knowledge. The ambiguity faced by an agent, in not knowing the
costs faced by others, plants the seed of doubt for strategic uncertainty.
The unique Nash equilibrium for this game [6] amounts to choosing a
“switching strategy” for each counterparty, j:
{
rollover if cj ≤ c⋆
foreclose if cj > c
⋆ , with c
⋆ ≡ bi + b
0
i + 1
ℓi + 1
. (2)
We now provide the basic intuition for this solution.
Assume that all counter-parties are subject to switching strategies, i.e.,
j will rollover its’ loan, if cj ≤ c⋆, or foreclose, otherwise. We wish to define
c⋆ in terms of i’s balance sheet. To this end, we introduce the probability
φ that no more than bi + b
0
i agents have cost greater than c
⋆ – and hence
foreclose their loans to i. In order to compute c⋆, consider the position of
an agent h with ch = c
⋆. This implies that h must be indifferent between
foreclosing and rolling over. On equating the expected payoffs corresponding
to the two options, we get φ = c⋆. Furthermore, φ is given by observing that
the probability that there are exactly k = 0, 1, . . . , ℓi agents that have their
cost greater than c⋆ is φk = 1/(ℓi + 1). Indeed, a priori, φk cannot depend
on k. Therefore φ = (bi + b
0
i + 1)φk = (bi + b
0
i + 1)/(ℓ+ 1), which, combined
with the previous result yields Eq. (2).
The independence of this result on the distribution of costs of miscoor-
dination implies that strategic uncertainty is relevant even in the absence of
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uncertainty on the costs of other players. In what follows, given our emphasis
on the collective behavior of the network, we assume cj = c for all creditors
j, irrespective of the counterparty. To simplify matters further, we also treat
the liquid asset holdings of agents, b0i to be constant across the network so
that b0i = b
0 for all i.
2.2 Network dynamics
We now present a stylized model that captures the growth and evolution of
credit networks by a series of Poisson processes. At rate γ, each agent i takes
out a loan from agent j, selected at random from the pool of other investors.
This implies (ℓi, bi) → (ℓi + 1, bi) and (ℓj, bj) → (ℓj , bj + 1). These loans
are unsecured and made without the knowledge of counterparties’ current
positions. This may be seen as a reflection of a priori trust between agents.
The loans mature and are amicably settled by counter-parties with rate λ.
This results in the link removal between agents and an update of their balance
sheets.
These two processes would, by themselves, produce a stochastic credit
network that belongs to the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graph ensemble [11], with
average degree γ/λ. Therefore, if λ is small, i.e., debt is long lived, these two
processes produce a dense credit network.
However, at random Poisson times tν , which occur with rate ν, informa-
tion on the current position (ℓi, bi) of agent i is disclosed to all of i’s lenders.
On the basis of this information, each lenders must decide to either roll-over
the loan until maturity or foreclose. The analysis of the foreclosure game
provides the lenders with a simple rule to follow, i.e., foreclose their loans if
c(ℓi + 1) > bi + b0 + 1 . (3)
As a consequence, agent i is said to default and is replaced by a new agent
with no links, i.e. (ℓi, bi)→ (0, 0). Agents, j, who previous borrowed from i
will each loose one liability, i.e., (ℓj , bj) → (ℓj − 1, bj). Finally, the lenders,
k, will loose one asset each, i.e., (ℓk, bk)→ (ℓk, bk − 1). If, instead, Eq. (3) is
not satisfied, then all of i’s counter-parties will rollover their loans.
Notice that default occurs solely due to the breakdown of trust. We do not
assume any exogenous shock that can lead to an agents’ failure. This reflects
our focus on understanding the role played by trust in credit networks.
In summary, an agent’s financial state is specified in terms of its position
(ℓi, bi) in the balance sheet plane. The three processes, (i) link addition at
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rate γ per agent, (ii) link decay at rate λ and (iii) information disclosure, at
rate ν per agent, induce a stochastic process in the (ℓ, b) plane of balance
sheets, as depicted in Fig. 2.
We now turn to the properties of the stationary state of these processes,
as a function of the parameters γ, λ, ν, b0 and c. For simplicity and without
loss of generality, we set γ = 1 in what follows, by an appropriate scaling of
time.
3 Results
One may probe the collective properties of the stationary state either via
direct numerical simulation of the processes or by numerical solving the as-
sociated master equation (see Appx. B and [12]). In Fig. 3 we plot simulation
results for the average connectivity ρ, once the system has reached a station-
ary state, as a function of the cost of miscoordination, c, for different values
of debt maturity λ. We note the following features; (i) For small c, there
is a dense network and ρ = 1/λ, indicative of a high level of trust. The
news that is released and permeates through the network is encouraging to
lenders, who thereby continue to rollover their loans. (ii) However, for large
c, lenders perceive that the cost of miscoordination from rolling over their
loans is high. Thus, doubts concerning the actions of other lenders leads to
the collective foreclose of loans, resulting in a sparse financial network. (iii)
For small values of λ and in an intermediate range of c, we note the coexis-
tence of both dense and sparse network solutions. Finally for larger λ, one
morphs continuously from a dense network to a sparse one, as c is increased.
This hysteresis may be appreciated as a consequence of the self-reinforcing
dynamics of trust. Far from the tipping point, a small incremental change
in c does not impact the stationary state and we continue to observe the
dense network. Once conditions deteriorate – with increasing c – beyond
the tipping point, a sparse network solution emerges. However, by the same
incremental change argument, as one decreases c – improve conditions – the
sparse network solution is stable and one needs to decrease c to well before
the tipping point to regain the dense network solution. This hysteresis is also
observed as a function of the liquid assets b0.
Similar stylized results have been found in other models of network growth
[13], which also articulate the underlying mathematical structure. Neverthe-
less, a qualitative understanding of our results is readily available via a simple
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approximation of the processes. The key variable is the endogenous rate of
link decay, µ, caused by the default of one counterparty. Thus, µ will cru-
cially depend on the rate ν at which news is released and the maturity λ of
debt contracts.
In a dense network, µ is negligible, whereas in the sparse network it is
expected to be sizable. In order to derive an expression for µ, we need to focus
on the twin stochastic processes (ℓ(t), b(t)) for the liability and asset positions
for a representative agent evolving in time t. This process starts from the
origin (ℓ(0), b(0)) = (0, 0) of Fig. 2 and drifts toward the top right-hand corner.
From any given point on the grid, jumps to the right and up occur at rate
γ = 1, whereas jumps to the left or below take place at rate λ + µ. In the
absence of the absorption process ν, both processes converge to a stationary
state, where ℓ(t) and b(t) are Poisson variables with mean 1/(λ+µ). However,
when ν is “turned on”, the process is absorbed whenever it is disclosed to be
in the shaded region, i.e., b(t)+ b0+1− c < cℓ(t), and restarts at the origin. If
ν is not too large, we may assume that (ℓ(t), b(t)) attains the stationary state
and hence
µ = ν Prob
{
b(t) + b0 + 1− c ≤ cℓ(t)} ≃ ν
2
erfc(Z) , (4)
where erfc(·) is the complimentary error function, arising from approximating
b(t) + b0 + 1− c− cℓ(t) by a Gaussian random variable, and
Z =
1− c+ b0(λ+ µ)√
2(1 + c2)(λ+ µ)
. (5)
A graphical solution to Eq. (4) is provided in the inset of Fig. 4, where
we have either one or three fixed points. Fig. 4 plots boundaries for regions
in the c vs. λ plane where these different situations arise. In the dense
(D) and sparse (S) phases, one obtains the stable fixed points µ ≃ 0 and
µ > 0, respectively. In the co-existence (CO) phase, however, the two stable
solutions are separated by a third, unstable fixed point. If we impose initial
conditions that placed the system to the left of the unstable solution, we
would obtain the stable stationary solution µ ≃ 0. Similarly, starting just to
the right of the unstable point would yield the solution µ > 0. A signature
for the transition from D → CO and S → CO is that the slope at the fixed
point is exactly one, i.e., it is tangential to the 45 degree line.
Inspection of the argument Z of the erfc function provides further insight.
For small values of both c and λ, only one solution with small µ ∼ e−(1−c)/(2λ)
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is possible, as Z is of order 1/
√
λ. For small λ and c ≃ 1, instead, the term
1−c is negligible with respect to the term b0(λ+µ). The argument of the erfc
function is Z ≃ b0√λ+ µ/2 and Eq. (4), again, admits one unique solution.
In the intermediate range, both solutions are possible, together with a third
unstable one.
While precise numerical values of the transition points cannot be accu-
rately obtained, the qualitative features are, however, clear. For example,
by increasing b0, or equivalently, decreasing c, the curve in the inset of Fig.
4 moves to the right, thus favoring the dense network phase (low µ). Like-
wise, decreasing ν flattens the function, suggesting that the coexistence of
solutions is possible only for large values of ν. This is indeed confirmed by
numerical simulations. Finally, notice that the dependence on λ only en-
ters in the combination λ + µ. Hence lowering debt maturity (increasing λ)
is equivalent to shifting the whole curve to the left which again results in
the disappearance of the coexistence region, as shown in Fig. 4 and in the
simulations.
4 Discussion
Our model and results highlight elements that were central to the interbank
credit freeze that has characterized the recent global financial crisis. First,
our model shows how the arrival of bad news about a counterparty and the
subsequent foreclosure decisions by its creditors can quickly spread across
the entire system. As Fig. 1 shows, beginning in mid-2007, the financial
world was bombarded with jittery news of larger-than-expected and pro-
jected losses. Exogenous disclosure requirements, as modelled by ν, in effect
forced banks to release information about their positions, providing investors
with signals that helped precipitate the crisis. In a globalized world, where in-
vestors require frequent and better quality information on their investments,
it had the effect of making the crisis especially severe and far-reaching.
Second, our model highlights maturity mismatches on balance sheets as
a key factor underlying the current crisis. Banks financed long-term, illiquid,
assets (such as special investment vehicles) by short-term borrowing on the
interbank market. This situation corresponds to a large ratio ν/λ in our
model, where debts have a long maturity compared to the timescale, 1/ν,
over which banks refinance their debts by convincing creditors to roll over
their loans. It is precisely, and only, in the limit of large ν/λ that a sharp
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transition such as the one observed in Fig. 3 can occur.
Third, our model sheds light on the nature of public sector intervention
during (and since) the crisis. The resumption of normality in the interbank
markets required a restoration of trust in the balance sheets of key financial
institutions. To facilitate this, central banks cut interest rates to historically
low levels, effectively decreasing the cost of miscoordination, c. That these
interest rates have been so low and for so long emphasizes the hysteresis
entailed in the restoration of trust – a key feature of our model. Central banks
have also been active in providing emergency lending to troubled institutions
as well as sovereign guarantees for borrowing activity, both of which are akin
to an increase in b0.
It is worth noting that while the method of analysis suggested by [5, 6]
affords a unique solution to individual coordination games, this uniqueness
is lost at the system level; multiple and simultaneous coordination games
played on a credit network are characterized by co-existence of equilibria
and hysteresis when debt is long-lived
The current policy debate on promoting systemic financial stability has
highlighted the importance of liquidity cushions in averting future crises [14,
15]. Our stylized model lends credence to such considerations. At the system-
wide level, our results and numerical simulations indicate that increasing b0,
i.e., liquid assets, for all agents (for a given debt maturity λ) results in dense
credit networks with ρ = 1/λ for larger values of c. At the individual level,
increasing b0i clearly motivates creditor j to roll over loans to agent i.
Relatedly, setting liquidity requirements to be proportional to short-term
debt, in the manner of the Greenspan-Guidotti rule [16] for short-term debt-
to-reserve ratios in emerging-market countries, can also improve system sta-
bility [17]. In our model, this amounts to setting b0i = βi + αℓi, where α is
some pre-defined ratio. From Eq. (2) this is equivalent to reducing the cost
of miscoordination c to c− α, and replacing b0i by βi − α. Clearly, however,
the benefits of ex post regulation of this kind need to be set against the ex
ante costs to banks of such regulation. Requiring banks to hold liquidity
cushions may lower the extent of lending ex ante and the overall implications
of such a policy for economic welfare is likely to be unclear.
An alternative to blanket leverage ratios and liquidity requirements is to
target such policies on those financial institutions in the network that are
most important [18]. There are interesting parallels here with the literature
on attacks on internet-router networks [19]. Extensions of our model along
such lines might allow for differential link formation, γ, or preferential linkage
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where agents in one sub-group prefer to interact with others in the same sub-
group. Agent heterogeneity of this kind holds out the possibility of promising
new insights into the design of financial stability policy.
The model presented here is simple. In particular, it does not allow for
any macroeconomic variability or the exogenous default by a group (or sub-
set) of agents. Moreover, it seems likely that the parameters of the model
will evolve according to economic conditions and will need to be determined
endogenously. For example, in a crisis, agents will strategically disclose in-
formation or form links in ways that improve their chances of a public sector
bailout. Incorporating a richer set of economic interactions into a network
setting such as ours is an important step for future research.
A Foreclosure game
We now provided a more detailed description and analysis of the foreclosure
game, drawing on lines of reasoning provided in [6].
A.1 Basic setup
There are three distinct time periods, initial, interim and final, which we
label 0, 1 and 2, respectively. At the beginning of period 0, each agent
i = 1, . . . , N is endowed with one unit of money, which may be used to
readily purchase consumption goods during either periods 1 or 2. We assume
that agents are indifferent between consuming during the interim and final
periods. This is formalized by requiring the utility function for each agent
to have the simple additive form
u(m1, m2) = m1 + m2 , (6)
where mt is the consumption during period t. This simplification allows us
concentrate on measuring coordination in terms of expected returns.
At the start of period 0, a pool of investors enter into a short-term loan
agreement with agent j, where each loan is for the nominal amount δ < 1.
If, for example, creditor i lends to j, then during the interim date i is given
the choice to either terminate the line of credit (foreclose), or rollover the
loan to the final date. If i chooses to rollover its loan and j’s investment is
successful, then i will receive one unit of money at the end of period 2.
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Thus, at the end of the initial period, j is characterized by three quanti-
ties: (i) number of liabilities, ℓj ∈ N, i.e., counter-parties that have lent to
j, (ii) number of illiquid assets, bj ∈ N, which counts the number of loans
given to other agents by j and (iii) level of liquid assets, b0j ≥ 0, which may
be thought of as cash reserves. One may interpret the loans made out by j
as a result of other agents tendering requests for loans at date 0 as well.
A.2 Signals and strategies
During the interim period, each of j’s lenders receive information on the
fundamental soundness, θ > 0 of j’s investment. If the fundamentals are
weak, j would seek an additional injection of capital, which would demand
that a large number lenders rollover their loans for the investment to succeed.
In particular, if ℓ′j is the number of early foreclosures, then the investment is
successful if and only if the number of rollovers satisfies ℓj − ℓ′j ≥ (bj + b0j ).
A high degree of coordination is required by the lenders to see the investment
through. In such a case of weak fundamentals, we say θ is large.
We take θ is uniformly distributed ex ante along the positive real axis.
The information for agent i is realized as the cost of miscoordination, ci, from
rolling over the loan. In particular,
ci = θ + si , (7)
where si ∈ [−ǫ, ǫ] is uniformly distributed idiosyncratic noise, with ǫ ≪ 1.
Thus, while each agent is subject to the same signal generation process, there
is asymmetric and imperfect information in the system.
A strategy for agent i is a rule of action that maps each realization of
ci to an action – whether to rollover the loan of foreclose. We assume that
all agents follow a simple switching strategy, i.e., there exists some c⋆, such
that, if ci ≥ c⋆ then i will foreclose its’ loan, while roll over if ci < c⋆. On the
basis of this strategy, we now solve for the Nash equilibrium of the game.
A.3 Nash equilibrium
If lender i forecloses its loan, then the payoff it receives is −δ. However, if i
rolls over the loan, then its payoff is

− ci − δ if ℓ′j > bj + b0j
1 − ci − δ if ℓ′j ≤ bj + b0j
, (8)
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The argument for the equilibrium solution is as follows. Agent i supposed
there is another agent h, who has also lent money to j. The cost of miscoor-
dination perceived by h is exactly at the switching threshold, i.e., ch = c
⋆.
Consequently, k will be indifferent between rolling over and foreclosing its
loan. We define φh to be the probability there are sufficiently few foreclosures
for the investment to succeed conditional on h’s cost,
φh ≡ Prob(ℓ′j ≤ ℓj − (bj + b0j ) | ch = c⋆) . (9)
Next, evaluating the expected payoff, we get the simple relationship
φh = c
⋆ . (10)
To evaluate Eq. (9), we note that, for given θ, the probability an agent will
rollover its loan is the probability its cost lies to the left of c⋆, i.e.,
c⋆ − θ + ǫ
2 ǫ
. (11)
Thus, the probability that exactly n out of the ℓj lenders to j rollover their
loans is
ψn(θ) =
(
ℓj
n
)
(c⋆ − θ + ǫ)n(c⋆ − θ + ǫ)ℓj−n
(2ǫ)ℓj
. (12)
From this we obtain
φh =
∑
n≥nj
∫
dθ
2ǫ
ψn(θ) , (13)
where nj = ℓj − (bj + b0j ). The integral is over the posterior distribution for
θ, which is uniform over [c⋆ − ǫ, c⋆ + ǫ]. Note that, despite our prior on θ
was improper, i.e., it had infinite mass, the posterior, which is a conditional
distribution is well defined. Finally, by a suitable change of variables, we
reduce the integral in Eq. (13) to a Beta function, which we readily evaluate.
Combining this result with Eq. (10) we get
c⋆ =
bj + b
0
j + 1
ℓj + 1
, (14)
which is independent of ǫ. Having worked out the switching threshold in
terms of the cost for a hypothetical agent h, agent i adopts this behavior.
Moreover, as there was nothing special in our choice of i, all lenders to j will
follow a similar exercise and adopt the switching strategy same result.
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B Master equation
For a given cost of miscoordination, c, the master equation for the joint
distribution of liabilities ℓ and assets b of a representative agent is given by
∂tP (ℓ, b) = µ δℓ,0 δb,0 + γ P (ℓ− 1, b) + γ P (ℓ, b− 1)
+ (λ+ µb)(ℓ+ 1)P (ℓ+ 1, b)
+ (λ+ µl)(b+ 1)P (ℓ, b+ 1)
−
[
2γ + (λ+ µb) ℓ+ (λ+ µℓ) b
+ ν Θ(c(ℓ+ 1)− 1− b− b0)
]
P (ℓ, b) , (15)
where ∂t is the partial derivative with respect to time and Θ(. . .) refers to
the Heaviside function. To keep our notation concise, we have left out the
time t label in the distribution.
The parameters γ, λ and ν are exogenously given rates of link creation,
dissipation and news arrival, respectively. The rates µ, µl and µb are en-
dogenous default rates, which are self-consistently determined against the
stationary distribution of (ℓ, b) as
µ = ν
∑
ℓ,b
Θ(c(ℓ+ 1)1− b− b0)P (ℓ, b) , (16)
µℓ =
ν
〈ℓ〉
∑
ℓ,b
Θ(c(ℓ+ 1)1− b− b0)) ℓ P (ℓ, b) , (17)
µb =
ν
〈b〉
∑
ℓ,b
Θ(c(ℓ+ 1)1− b− b0)) b P (ℓ, b) . (18)
Here, 〈b〉 and 〈ℓ〉 are the mean assets and liabilities, respectively. The angled
brackets refers to the average over P (ℓ, b), which in fact yields 〈b〉 = 〈ℓ〉.
We can understand the master equation via simple geometric considera-
tions. If we consider any arbitrary point (ℓ, b) in the interior of our lattice,
the probability that an agent has this balance sheet positions is given by
the probability there will be an incremental hop to (ℓ, b) from one of the
neighboring sites. The rate at which there will be a hop from the left or
bottom site is the rate γ at which either a new liability or asset, respectively,
is added. The rate at which a hop occurs from either above or the right is
simply the rate at which an asset or liability are lost. In the latter case, this
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rate may be decomposed into two aspect: (i) the natural dissipation of a link,
i.e., λ and (ii) the probability that our representative agent had borrowed
from another agent who defaulted and lost all links after revealing, with rate
ν, its balance sheet to its creditors. The rate at which such incidents occur
is µb. A similar argument may be used to construct the rate at which assets
are lost as well. Whenever an agent defaults, it is stripped of all its asset
and replaced by a new agent, who starts at (ℓ, b) = (0, 0). The first term in
Equation (15) reflects this action.
A full analytical solution for Equation (15)-(18) is complicated due to the
presence of various non-linearities. We can nevertheless numerically solve the
system for the stationary state.
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Figure 1: 1 Month US LIBOR-OIS Rates, in basis points, during the financial
crisis of 2007-08. The events highlighted are: (i) August 9, 2007 – BNP
Paribas suspends calculation of asset values of three money market funds
exposed to US sub-prime mortgages; (ii) November 20, 2007 – Freddie Mac
announces losses for the third quarter of 2007; (iii) January 24, 2008 – Socie´te´
Ge´ne´rale reveals trading losses resulting from fraudulent activities by a single
trader; (iv) March 13, 2008 – Bear Stearns files for bankruptcy, and (v)
September 15, 2008 – Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy.
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Figure 2: Schematic diagram of operations performed in the liabilities-assets,
(ℓ, b), plane during our network dynamics. The shaded area correspond to
where Eq. (3) is satisfied and foreclosures take place. With rate γ, a credit
relationship i→ j is established. Agent i gains an assets (bi → bi+1), while
j increments the number of liabilities it holds (ℓj → ℓj + 1). With rate λ,
however this link matures and expires, causing a rearrangement of balance
sheets. Finally, with rate ν, debtor k reveals its’ balance sheet position,
(ℓk, bk) to the creditors. If k is found to be in the shaded region, foreclosures
take place and k defaults, thereby transporting it back to the origin, i.e.,
(ℓk, bk) → (0, 0). Agent m, who had borrowed from k, looses one liability
(ℓm → ℓm − 1), while agent h who lent to k looses an asset (bh → bh − 1).
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Figure 3: Average density ρ in the network as a function of cost c for different
values of λ. The symbols are produced from direct simulations while the
lines are from solving the corresponding master equation numerically. In
producing the curves we took ν = 2.0 and N = 1000.
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Figure 4: Phase diagram in the c vs. λ plane, where the boundaries distin-
guishes the set of parameters that result in either a dense (D) or sparse (S)
network. We also note that for small λ, there is a third phase of co-existence
(CO) between the dense and sparse states. In the Insert we plot erfc(Z) as a
function of µ, for λ = 0.01, where Z is given by Eq. (5). The different curves
correspond to different c values. We not the existence of either one or three
fixed points.
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